Under that optics then the A500 was a failure as a computer and a success as a gaming machine.
No-one bought productivity software or applications, but everyone bought games.
It was a huge success as a gaming machine, a moderate success as a graphic design/music machine, a big success in the video editing home computer segment (invented it) and an unmitigated failure in the office productivity segment (which became extremely important in the mid 90s, but is moving to "the cloud" now).
No-one bought productivity software or applications, but everyone bought games.
This is so deep issue one may call it root of all causes of the Commodore demise. CBM was never really successful on the US business market and the company virtually left high-end desktop market after the failure of CBM II. Attempt to return to the "serious market" with Amiga was only of limited success. In 1984 (after the first great price war), Commodore sold more computers than all other computer companies (even more than IBM!), but these were dirty cheap VIC and C64 models with ultra low margins and so CBMs revenues were far bellow other major computer companies. In the end, it was the business market that was a driving force behind software and hardware sales leading to the ultimate domination of the IBM PC standard.
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